




The financial crisis of the past three years has been
the most severe episode of global financial instabili-
ty since the 1930s. It has resulted in a marked de-
cline of world trade, and the first global aggregate
fall in economic activity and output for more than 70
years.The response by policy makers has been equal-
ly dramatic.They have thrown away their rulebooks,
applying huge monetary and fiscal stimulus and pro-
viding massive financial support to banks and other
financial intermediaries.
Whilst trade and output are now recovering, this cri-
sis is far from fully resolved. We face three closely
intertwined policy challenges. First, how do we en-
sure enough growth of private sector spending to
prevent a renewed contraction of output and em-
ployment, as fiscal and monetary stimulus are with-
drawn? Second, what structural economic changes
must take place for there to be an orderly correction
of the continuing and ultimately unsustainable pat-
tern of world savings and investment, and how will
the necessary investment for this structural change
be financed? Third, what will replace the old failed
framework of prudential financial regulation, and
can this be effective at achieving two potentially con-
flicting ends: both allowing banks and other inter-
mediaries to finance the required growth of private
spending and preventing a further large scale and
unsustainable growth of credit and asset prices?
This paper addresses the third of these questions,
examining closely current proposals for a new
“macroprudential” approach to policy making. It
draws on a substantial body of recent work, under-
taken by the author (in particular Milne 2009b) and
by many others. It argues that this new approach to
policy making can help reduce vulnerabilities ema-
nating from within the financial system (the cross-
sectional dimension of systemic financial risk associ-
ated with “network” linkages) and so make another
financial crisis less likely; and that the design of this
framework is also critical to restoring confidence in
the financial sector and so to supporting the recov-
ery of private expenditure.But we are mistaken if we
assume that macroprudential policy or other techno-
cratic initiatives can remove boom and bust (the
time series dimension of systemic financial risk) or
deal with the current underlying structural problems
of the global economy that threaten a renewed,deep
and long-lasting economic slump. Achieving those
goals requires us to address the fundamental social
and political obstacles to the effective operation of
the global economy.
The roots of financial instability
Defining terms
We need to be clear what we mean by the phrase
financial instability and its close cousin systemic
financial risk.
Ferguson (2003) defines systemic financial risk “…as
a situation characterized by these three basic crite-
ria: (1) some important set of financial asset prices
has diverged sharply from fundamentals; and/or (2)
market functioning and credit availability, domesti-
cally and perhaps internationally, have been signifi-
cantly distorted; with the result that (3) aggregate
spending deviates (or is likely to deviate) significant-
ly, either above or below, from the economy’s ability
to produce.” But this definition is somewhat unsatis-
factory, confusing cause (divergence of prices from
fundamentals) with effect (the resulting distortion of
financial markets, credit availability and aggregate
spending).
Besar et. al. (2010) propose instead the following
(covering non-financial and financial systemic risk):
“A systemic risk materialises when an initial distur-
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bance is transmitted through the networks of inter-
connections that link firms, households and financial
institutions with each other; leading, as a result, to
either the breakdown or degradation of these net-
works.”
Milne (2009b) offers a closely related definition of
financial instability, arguing that this occurs when
there is “widespread breakdown of financial flows”.
This is a consequence, but not a necessary conse-
quence, of the materialisation of a systemic financial
risk. Such a risk can materialise in only one part of
the financial system (an example written up in
Credit magazine is the systemic disruption of the
credit derivative markets in May of 2005, when Ford
and General Motors lost their investment grade rat-
ing) and hence not result in widespread disruption of
financial flows. The current crisis has been both a
breakdown of network of financial intermediation
and a major disruption of financial flows.
Network interactions
Increasingly policy discussion is recognising the
importance of network linkages to episodes of finan-
cial instability. Haldane (2009) analyses the financial
sector and the network relationships between firms
as a complex adaptive system (for a broader review
of complex adaptive systems with many economic
applications see Beinhocker 2007). Haldane empha-
sises two aspects of network interconnections in the
financial sector, namely complexity and lack of
diversity.Connections within the international finan-
cial system have become increasingly complex over
time and characterised by the increasing importance
of a small number of nodes (large global institutions)
connected to a large proportion of other nodes
(other financial institutions.) Also the portfolios of
financial institutions have become increasingly less
diverse, with the transfer of risk resulting in large
common exposures.
There are now many models of such network inter-
connections in the financial sector and consequent
domino-effects,with solvency or liquidity problems in
one institution leading to similar problems in other
institutions. See for example Nier et. al. (2008),
Aikman et. al. (2009) and May and Arinaminpathy
(2009).As emphasised by Brunnermeier et.al.(2009),
these network interconnections mean that a firm can
be systemically significant (i.e., a transmitter of finan-
cial disturbance) either individually or as part of a
“herd” of institutions taking on similar exposures.
What exactly are these network linkages between
firms? These are not necessarily just direct exposures
(the assets of one firm being the liability of another).
Besar et. al. (2010) identify four distinct networks
which may transmit an initial disturbance amongst
financial institutions.These are:
1. payments systems and other financial infrastruc-
ture such as systems of clearing and settlement;
2. short-term funding markets;when institutions use
short-term funding to hold long-term illiquid or
potentially illiquid assets;
3. common exposures in collateral, securities and
derivatives markets; and 
4. counterparty exposure to other financial market
participants, especially in over-the counter markets.
Other network linkages could, arguably, be added to
this list.For example a major contribution to the cur-
rent crisis appears to have been the withdrawal of
institutions, following losses, from their role as mar-
ket makers and dealers in structured credit securi-
ties,making it very difficult as a result to obtain mar-
ket prices and hence increasing uncertainty and lim-
iting the flow of information in the market place.
The common feature of these networks is that they
can serve to propagate a crisis, with an initial distur-
bance creating problems for some institutions that
then in turn cascade through these networks.
Boom and bust
Another feature common to all financial crises is
boom and bust. Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) pro-
vide a comprehensive quantitative historical over-
view of past banking, exchange rate and sovereign
debt crises, going back some eight centuries. They
document that virtually all these crises have been
associated with large scale and ultimately unsustain-
able increases of indebtedness.Widespread availabil-
ity of credit also leads to substantial rises and subse-
quent correction of asset prices. The aftermath of
these crises then leads to substantial and extended
loss of output and employment.
These credit booms are exaggerated in the upswing
by a number of positive feedback loops (Milne 2009a,
32–37) for a more detailed discussion). Lenders, mis-
takenly, interpret low levels of default as an indica-
tion that credit risk is low. Borrowers can obtain
credit relatively easily against the increased value of
land and other collateral. The drive to maintaingrowth of lending undermines lending standards.
Households and investors can have irrational expec-
tations about the continued growth of incomes and
asset prices, expectations reinforced by various
social and cultural influences (a point emphasised by
Shiller 2005). Governments may cut tax rates or
increasing government spending in the mistaken
belief that the higher level of economic activity is
permanent, not temporary, or simply to take the
maximum possible political advantage from short-
term prosperity.
There is an international dimension to many of these
episodes. Some of the most pronounced credit
booms and busts have occurred when exchange rates
have been pegged against other currencies (for
example in Scandinavia and in the UK in the late
1980s and early 1990s, and in Thailand, Malaysia and
other countries in the mid-1990s). As long as the
exchange rate peg remained credible a relatively
small interest rate differential was able to attract
large volumes of short-term external funds and so
finance the continued boom of expenditure.
There is a related international dimension to the cur-
rent structural problems of the global economy. We
have not yet found a way to ensure that the global
savings are used, in the main, for productive invest-
ment and so do not result in an unsustainable build
up to debt.
An assessment of macroprudential policy proposals
Commentators and policy makers now agree on the
need for new “macroprudential” approaches to
financial regulation to contain the risks of system
wide financial crisis (see for example the influential
report written by the chairman of the UK FSA
(Turner 2009). A number of new macroprudential
institutions are being established, including the Eu-
ropean Systemic Risk Board for the EU,the Council
for Financial Stability in the UK and the proposed
US Financial Oversight Council. These bodies will
provide advice and analysis and recommendations to
regulators and to monetary policy makers. But we
are still as yet quite a way from a consensus on how
macroprudential policy will operate.The Basel Com-
mittee has agreed that capital requirements will be
varied pro-cyclically to counter boom and bust (Ba-
sel Committee 2009), but there is not yet any agree-
ment amongst its members about how this will be
done.The Bank of England has released a consulta-
tion paper (Bank of England 2009).but this also
leaves most features of the new proposed policy re-
gime undecided.
A key policy question is finding the appropriate bal-
ance between measures to promote network
resilience (in the terminology of Borio 2009) the
cross-sectional dimension of systemic financial risk)
and measures to limit credit expansions and asset
price growth (the time series dimension of systemic
financial risk). This is because the trigger for finan-
cial crisis is the combination of credit boom and net-
work vulnerability.A crisis occurs when the preced-
ing credit boom is of a sufficiently large magnitude
to trigger instability in the networks linking together
financial institutions and their customers.The risk of
financial crisis can be reduced by tackling either of
these two causes.
The cross-sectional dimension 
It is relatively easy to reduce the cross-sectional
dimension of systemic financial risk.The key source
of the cross-sectional dimension of systemic financial
risk is bank moral hazard. Both commercial and
investment banks benefit from the explicit and
implicit government safety net. They know that in
extremis, the authorities will protect them from fail-
ure.Therefore they are incentivised to take on risks
with a large downside tail. This in turn encourages
strategies of extreme leverage,in which the upside of
return is increased while the downside continues to
be protected by the taxpayer.
This key weakness is exaggerated by a variety of
conflicts of interest and weaknesses of governance.
Milne (2009a, chapters 7 and 8) provides an over-
view of such problems in the current crisis. Merrill
Lynch and UBS built up huge portfolios of highly
risky ABS-CDO securities. Weak corporate gover-
nance and risk management failed to restrain the
ambitions of their aggressive chief executives. The
massive losses at the US government agencies
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were rooted in gross
conflicts of interest, between their twin roles as for-
profit companies serving shareholders and public
purpose entities supporting the US housing market.
Across many institutions sales staff and traders were
able to increase revenues and their own remunera-
tion by transacting at the expense of the customers
they dealt with, through the sale of inappropriate
investments or the failure to communicate the
potential risk of loss.
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There were further system-wide weaknesses.Lack of
public disclosure made it all but impossible to track
the exposures of insurance counterparties, such as
the monoline insurers and AIG. Banks built up mas-
sive portfolios of long-term structured credit securi-
ties, financed almost entirely short term under the
naive assumption of reliable liquidity for the resale
of these assets.The potential for a large scale correc-
tion of residential and commercial property prices
was largely ignored.
Several measures can be taken to address these
weaknesses. Higher capital reduces risk exposure
and also lowers the incentives for moral hazard.
Rules on liquidity will contain the risks of maturity
mismatch and withdrawal of short-term funding.
New requirements on disclosure of exposures and
for transferring of positions onto central counterpar-
ties can prevent a repeated crisis of counterparty
risk. Some commentators argue that the fragility of
the system can be enhanced by introducing arrange-
ments for the orderly closure of distressed financial
institutions,although it is far from clear how this will
work in practice.
Structural regulation can also be used to contain the
cross-sectional dimension of risk, as argued in the
Volcker report, recommendation 1 (G30, 2009). We
can address both moral hazard and conflicts of inter-
est by imposing rules that prevent or limit engage-
ment in any risky activities that do not directly serve
customers, for example, proprietary trading, or
investment in risky asset classes.
All these measures can help make networks of finan-
cial intermediation much more resilient to shocks.
But how costly are they? It is sometimes argued,
most often by senior bankers,that measures of these
kinds will substantially raise the costs of financial
intermediation and thus reduce future output
growth. In fact there are several reasons for believ-
ing that these costs are relatively low:
• Greater use of relatively expensive bank liabili-
ties, such as long term debt or equity, do not nec-
essarily translate into greatly higher costs for
bank borrowers; this is because there is an offset-
ting change in the “monetary policy reaction func-
tion”, i.e., monetary policy makers reduce their
target rate of interest in order to maintain aggre-
gate demand.
• The true costs of bank equity are greatly exagger-
ated. More equity is safer equity and this reduces
its required return. Overall equity is not much
more expensive than debt (see Milne and Onorato
2010) for a more formal discussion of why capital
employed to hold credit risky exposures such as
corporate loans requires a relatively low rate of re-
turn).
• Measures that increase the costs of bank liabili-
ties put greater pressure on banks to reduce the
costs of their operations, i.e., makes them more
efficient.
• Limiting proprietary trading and other high-risk
activities may somewhat reduce bank revenues
and hence limit payments to senior management;
but this does not prevent profitable trading activ-
ities.These simply move into the hedge fund sec-
tor and shareholders can continue to share in the
profits of these activities by providing the neces-
sary capital.
There is however a very real problem with both cap-
ital and liquidity requirements that has not yet been
properly addressed by the authorities (see Besar et.
al.(2010) and Milne (2010) for further discussion and
examples). Inflexible requirements make it ex-
tremely difficult for banks and other financial institu-
tions to absorb shocks and so create rather than pre-
vent network instability. For example a decline in
asset values can trigger forced sales at fire sale prices,
thereby exaggerating the initial loss of net worth.
The implications are clear. We need to move away
from rigid requirements to guideline target require-
ments with a ladder of penalties (such as limitations
on dividends and remuneration of senior staff) of
increasing severity as net worth and liquidity fall
below target. Such flexibility of policy is essential if
private sector intermediation and private spending is
to recover while the large current fiscal stimulus is
withdrawn.
The time series dimension
It is harder to reduce the time series dimension of
systemic financial risk. This has two root causes. It
arises partly because of the same moral hazard and
weaknesses of governance and risk management
that create the cross-sectional dimension of risk. As
a result financial institutions have few and weak
incentives to respond to the build up of macroeco-
nomic imbalances. They believe, correctly, that they
will be bailed out when the bubble bursts.Therefore
they do not hold back from acquiring risk during a
cumulative credit and asset price boom.This contri-bution to the time series dimension of systemic
financial instability can be addressed by improving
incentives and discouraging individual institutions
from contributing to a widespread credit and asset
boom,i.e.,by the same measures that are required to
improve network resilience and reduce the cross-
sectional dimension of systemic financial instability.
There is a second constellation of causes at the root
of the time series dimension of systemic financial
risk. As noted above there are a number of behav-
ioural, social and political pressures that underpin
boom and bust.These cannot be ignored and justify
the long standing concern of macroeconomic policy
makers with rapid increase in debt and asset prices,
and the potential for widespread disruption of finan-
cial flows  that these create.
This concern was evident in the standard approach
to macroeconomic policy used during the Bretton
Woods era of fixed exchange rates and limited cross-
border capital flows. Then the authorities applied
two macro-instruments – monetary and fiscal policy
– to achieve two macroeconomic goals.The first was
internal or price stability, maintaining output in line
with potential supply. The second was avoiding
financial instability, ensuring that a large external
deficit did not trigger an exchange rate crisis and
realignment, i.e., a disruption of financial flows.
While a different approach is now needed in our pre-
sent world of deregulated capital markets operating
across national borders, there are still lessons from
that era for the operation of policy today.We cannot
address the time-series dimension of systemic finan-
cial risk using monetary policy because that must be
devoted to ensuring price stability. We still might
expect to use fiscal policy to control unsustainable
cross-border capital flows. But, since financial insta-
bility can now emerge in many different parts of the
financial system, not just in foreign exchange mar-
kets, there is a case for using additional macropru-
dential tools, such as cyclically varying capital re-
quirements to offset boom and bust in credit and
asset markets.
But we must not have exaggerated expectations of
what these additional measures can or should
achieve. It is not necessary to eliminate boom and
bust altogether;we simply have to reduce the magni-
tude of such episodes sufficiently such that they do
not threaten financial stability. We must be aware
that regulatory interference in loan and credit deci-
sions can be costly, especially if there are substantial
and unpredictable changes in regulatory capital
requirements interfering with forward business plan-
ning. If these measures are unpredictable they will
interfere with monetary policy transmission and dis-
courage growth of private sector spending as the cur-
rent global fiscal stimulus is withdrawn.
It is also naive to believe that the behavioural, social
and political forces supporting boom and bust can be
overcome using regulatory measures alone.The like-
ly outcome of attempting this is that regulation itself
becomes politicised and discredited. The best that
can be hoped for (for more discussion of this point,
see Milne (2009b) is that some mechanical rules for
altering capital and liquidity requirements, perhaps
together with other regulatory rules,such as limits on
mortgage loan to value ratios,can dampen boom and
bust a little and help prevent local and regional
boom and bust within larger monetary areas.
Conclusions
Economic policy makers currently face extremely
difficult challenges. One is the introduction of a
more macroprudential approach to policy making,
supporting the growth of private credit as the cur-
rent global fiscal stimulus is withdrawn, while at the
same time eliminating the risk of a further unsus-
tainable expansion of credit and asset prices and
renewed financial instability.
This goal will be achieved at the lowest cost by con-
centrating on measures to increase the resilience of
the financial system to external shock. Possible mea-
sures include higher but more flexible capital and
liquidity requirements, improved counterparty dis-
closure and, where possible, transfer of exposures
onto central counterparties, and also rules limiting
bank engagement in risky and speculative activities.
Restraining credit and asset price booms is more dif-
ficult.Measures such as introducing pro-cyclical cap-
ital requirements may be of some assistance, but
these cannot be expected to remove the underlying
behavioural, social and political pressures that un-
derpin these periods of excess. Nor will these be
enough,on their own,to resolve the underlying struc-
tural problems of the global economy, with a large
proportion of global savings flows financing unpro-
ductive household and government borrowing and
so contributing to continued unsustainable build up
of debt.
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Policy makers must also ensure that new macropru-
dential policy measures – e.g., higher capital and liq-
uidity requirements – do not add further stress to
already strained bank balance sheets and hence pro-
voke a renewed global downturn. We should not
delay the introduction of these new requirements –
because delay itself creates uncertainty and adds to
bank balance sheet stress – but should apply them in
a more flexible way than the Basel minima were
applied in the past, for example, setting ambitious
guideline targets for capital and liquidity but allow-
ing banks to operate below these targets with a lad-
der of penalties (such as limitations on dividends and
remuneration of senior staff) the greater the short-
fall relative to the target requirement.
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